

The Computational Complexity of Genetic Diversity

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The puzzle of sex: No easy answers

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- ▶ Several answers to the problem
- ▶ Key high level idea:
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Computational Question

Does diversity persist in the limit? Yes/No?

Biological terms

Related work

Results and Techniques

Future work

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- ▶ **Panmictic:** Every pair of individuals can produce offspring (no male, female distinction).

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When two individuals mate: e.g., $X_i X_j$ and $X_{i'} X_{j'}$ the possible offspring combinations are $X_i X_j, X_i X_{j'}, X_{i'} X_j, X_{i'} X_{j'}$ and the number of offsprings is proportional to the corresponding entries of fitness (symmetric, positive) matrix W .

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If two individuals are picked at random and mate, the expected frequencies (of next generation) reduce to (called **replicator dynamics**):

$$x'_i = x_i \frac{(Wx)_i}{x^T Wx} \quad \text{where } (Wx)_i = \sum_j W_{ij} x_j.$$

x is a vector that lies in the simplex of size n , denoted by Δ_n .

Dynamics on Haploids

- ▶ *Chastain, Livnat, Papadimitriou, Vazirani '14*: Strong connection between Game Theory, MWUA and haploid evolution.
- ▶ *Mehta, P, Piliouras '15*: In the limit, under mild conditions on fitness matrix, haploid dynamics converges to monomorphic populations (no diversity).

Complexity

- ▶ *Nissan '06* and then *Etessami, Lochbihler '08* studied the question of whether a game has an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
- ▶ *Conitzer '13* showed this to be Σ_2^P -complete.
- ▶ See also *Ibsen-Jensen, Chatterjee and Nowak '15*.

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If W is positive then we have the following two facts:

- ▶ Replicator dynamics converges to a fixed point x^* (limit point).
- ▶ The update rule is a diffeomorphism on Δ_n .

Theorem (Main result 1)

*Given a $n \times n$ fitness matrix W for a diploid organism with single locus, it is **NP-hard** to decide if, **under evolution (replicator dynamics), diversity will survive (by converging to a specific mixed equilibrium with positive probability)** when starting allele frequencies are picked at random from Δ_n .*

Our results

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Theorem (Main result 2)

*If the entries of a fitness matrix W are **i.i.d.** from an atomless (say continuous) distribution then with **probability at least 1/3** (over random entries and initial population), **diversity will survive.***

Dynamical systems to the rescue

Using techniques from [dynamical systems](#), in particular [Center-stable manifold theorem](#) and the two facts mentioned above:

Lemma

The set of [initial conditions](#) in Δ_n so that the dynamics [converges](#) to “[unstable](#)” fixed points is of [measure zero](#).

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Easy remark

We need to characterize the “stable” fixed points to answer our question!

High level intuition

Tossing a coin, 3 possible steady (equilibrium) states:



▶ Tail “Stable”



▶ Head “Stable”



▶ Landing on its edge
“Unstable”

Do the set of “stable” fixed points contain mixed fixed points (support greater than one)?

Lemma

A fixed point p is “stable” iff the strategy profile (p, p) is a *Nash equilibrium* of the 2-player symmetric coordination game (W, W) and also T_W is negative semi-definite. We also call it *stable Nash*.

T_W is the resulting matrix if we subtract first row/column from all other rows/columns of W and then remove the first row/column.

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Definition

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Lemma

The set of fixed points with positive measure of attraction is sandwiched between strict stable Nash and stable Nash fixed points.

Proof of Theorem 2

It is easy to prove via inclusion-exclusion arguments (avoiding correlations):

Lemma

If the entries of a positive symmetric matrix W are i.i.d. from an atomless (say continuous) distribution then with probability at least $1/3 - o(1)$ we have that every diagonal entry W_{ii} is dominated by W_{ij}, W_{ji} for some j (different for every i).

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Hence, we don't have pure symmetric Nash equilibrium!

Therefore all the Nash stable and strict Nash stable fixed points must be mixed!

Proof of Theorem 1

Use same reduction for both notions of stability. The reduction is from clique. Let E' be the adjacency matrix of input graph G , so that all zero entries are replaced by $-h$ (a large number depending on the graph size). Define the following fitness matrix W :

E'		$k-1$	$-\epsilon$
		$-\epsilon$	$k-1$
$k-1$	$-\epsilon$	h	$-\epsilon$
$-\epsilon$	$k-1$	$-\epsilon$	h

- ▶ If G has a clique of size k then (W, W) has a mixed strict Nash stable.
- ▶ If (W, W) has a mixed Nash stable, then G has a clique of size k .
- ▶ We can make W positive, by adding the same number $c > 0$ to every entry (“stability” does not change!).

- ▶ Introduce mutations.
- ▶ Changing environments.
- ▶ Generalize results for more genes, the equations are more complicated!
- ▶ More connections between theoretical computer science and evolution.

Thank you!

Center-Stable Manifold theorem

Center-Stable Manifold theorem (informally)

If the rule of the dynamics is a diffeomorphism then

- ▶ For every fixed point \mathbf{p} , there exists an open ball $B_{\mathbf{p}}$ so that if $\mathbf{x}(n)$ is inside $B_{\mathbf{p}}$ for all $n \geq 0$ then $\mathbf{x}(0)$ belongs to a (local) center stable manifold $W_{SC}(\mathbf{p})$ which has dimension equal to the dimension of the space spanned by eigenvectors of the Jacobian (at \mathbf{p}) with absolute value ≤ 1 .

